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No membership without stability in Northern Kosovo:  
Seven recommendations on how to achieve it  
 
Imke Pente
With a three-month postponement, the European 
Council agreed to grant Candidate Status to Serbia 
in early March. This right and groundbreaking 
decision may yet not release Serbia from settling 
its relationship with Kosovo and from advancing in 
settling Kosovo’s status. Serbia implemented the 
agreements of the Pristina-Belgrade dialogue held 
under the auspices of the European External Action 
Service only sluggishly. The dialogue has been 
subject to recurrent adjournments due to growing 
tensions between the conflicting parties. The fatal 
escalation of the customs conflict between Serbia 
and Kosovo in July 2011 illustrated the limbo in 
northern Kosovo threatening to overturn. The clear 
results of the referendum about the recognition 
of the government in Pristina held in Northern 
Kosovo in February 2012 constitute yet another 
indicator for the deadlock between the Albanian 
and Northern Serb communities. For the sake of 
stability, the EU member states must not be lenient 
with the status settlement question before allowing 
Serbia membership in the European Union.
The Conflict in Northern Kosovo and Its 
Meaning for EU Accession
Since the deployment of the United Nations 
Interims Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) and Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence, the Serbian government has 
established a parallel government system in the 
majorly Serb populated areas in Kosovo which 
it has maintained in the north of Kosovo until 
today. The Serbian government does not recognize 
the sovereignty of the former Serbian province 
and seeks to enforce its claims to the territory. 
Consequently, the Kosovo government is de facto 
unable to exercise control over the northern areas 
which feature a vacuum in rule of law, a struggling 
legal economy, and high levels of organized 
crime and corruption. The extensive services and 
transfers mainly benefit a nationalist minority 
who is thus incentivized to sustain the unstable 
situation which impedes a better living for the 
ordinary people.
On the other hand, the Kosovo government 
has started implementing its “Strategy for the 
North” which aims at establishing authority 
over the northern areas. Supported by strong 
international actors, such as the United States 
and the International Civilian Office (ICO)1, the 
Thaci government initiates deeply symbolic steps 
which are neither communicated with the UN 
Mission2 nor with the Serb community. Kosovo’s 
attempts to install control over the north have yet 
been declined by Serb demonstrations and riots 
which culminated in the customs conflict in July 
2011. As response to the Serbian import embargo 
on Kosovo goods, the Thaci government issued a 
retaliatory act against Serbian products. During 
the attempt to enforce the boycott by establishing 
control over two border posts in northern Kosovo, 
Kosovo Serb resistance escalated and ended up in 
the killing of one Kosovo Police officer. 
Given the two countries’ (potential) EU 
candidate status, the EU plays a crucial and 
influential role in paving the way to a status 
settlement despite the fact that five of the 
twenty-seven member states have not recognized 
Kosovo’s sovereignty. The territorial dispute 
between Kosovo and Serbia immediately touches 
the EU’s interests in a stable and prosperous 
neighborhood. The Serbian blocking policy 
and the insensitive attempts by the Kosovo 
government undermine these deep-rooted interests 
of the EU and therefore need to be overcome with 
a sustainable compromise.
1 The International Civilian Office was established in response to 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008 by the 
recognizing countries in order to facilitate the implementation of 
the Comprehensive Status Settlement Proposal. 
2 Kosovo has not been recognized by the UN Security Council so 
that resolution 1244 remains the only internationally recognized 
legal basis for Kosovo’s governance. 
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A promising status solution has to be mutually 
acceptable to the conflicting parties and conducive 
to the two countries’ EU accession perspectives. It 
has to settle the conflict and thus induce stability 
and the consolidation of a Kosovo state. On the 
one hand, this path implies compliance with the 
founding principles of the European Union and 
territorially-wide governance in order to prevent 
anarchic pockets. On the other hand, the policy 
needs to be accepted by all stakeholders at the 
local, the national and the international level in 
order to render it sustainable. 
None of the policy options proposed during 
the status settlement debates, namely Partition, a 
Hong Kong Model, and the Status Quo constitute 
a promising, mutually acceptable solution. 
Furthermore, border shifts as in a Territorial 
Exchange should possibly be avoided in order not 
to create different dispersals of minorities which 
could cause further instability. Instead the “quasi-
federal” political system of Spain is a useful 
source for lessons given its equally diverse and 
similarly intricate constellation. 
Recommendations
Despite the relatively extensive competencies of 
the Serb municipalities granted by the Kosovo 
Constitution, the Kosovo government should 
reconsider the peculiarity of the northern areas 
and widen the scope of self-government. In order 
to achieve the badly needed compromise, I would 
like to give the following seven recommendations: 
Special Status for the North. The northern 
areas of Kosovo should be conceded more 
competencies in three areas of competency, 
namely public security, judiciary and taxation. 
Given the deep distrust of the Serb population 
towards Kosovo authority, northern Kosovo 
should be given the responsibility for public 
security. The right to participate in selecting 
the local police station commanders ought to 
be extended to administrative and financial 
authority, while remaining accountable to the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs in Pristina at last 
resort. Furthermore, allowing the northern areas to 
have their own High Court of Justice is likely to 
contribute to legal trust as well as certainty, and 
thus a higher degree of stability in the north. In 
contrast to the other municipalities in Kosovo, 
the northern territories should have the right to 
collect taxes. This privilege would incentivize 
the autonomous government to establish a legal 
economic sector which is almost absent at the 
moment. 
Given the deadlock between the parties to the 
conflict, the European Union has to intervene in a 
multi-dimensional manner to convert the current 
reservations into cooperation:
Conditionality on Kosovo Government. The 
Thaci government has to sincerely reconsider the 
well-being of the Serb population and behave in 
a more conciliatory manner. Its political approach 
needs to aim at integrating the Serb community 
into a multi-ethnic Kosovo system. In the face 
of the influential role the United States play 
in Kosovo, the EU has to coordinate with the 
US government and convince it to encourage 
a less confronting policy in order to prevent 
counterproductive opportunity structures. 
Conditionality on Serbian Government. The 
Serbian government has to stop undermining the 
state consolidation process in Kosovo and resign 
from providing parallel governance structures 
in northern Kosovo. The policy is diametrically 
opposed to the goals the EU seeks to realize 
in the country. Despite the recently granted 
candidate status for Serbia, the EU has to state 
clearly that an ultimate accession yet remains 
impossible, unless the territorial conflict is settled. 
Terminating the limbo in northern Kosovo has to 
be acknowledged as a deep-rooted interest by all 
EU member states. Therefore, they have to insist 
on Serbia recognizing Kosovo’s independence as 
a condition for EU membership. 
Intensified European Public Diplomacy 
in Serbia. During recent years, Serbia has 
featured a negative trend in public support for 
EU membership which may be explained by 
the protracted accession process with numerous 
loopholes as well as by the extremely low level 
of information about the EU. Given the still 
expected positive economic opportunities from 
EU membership which are desperately needed in 
the face of the economic decline in the country, 
the EU needs to make an effort to reverse the 
negative trend by intensifying public diplomacy 
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in Serbia. Stronger public support would again 
serve as a multiplier of the pressure on the Serbian 
government to change its policy towards Kosovo.
Building Bridges to the Serb Population in 
Northern Kosovo. The donor community has 
so far paid little attention to the Serb population 
in Kosovo in general, and in the northern areas 
in particular. This has caused a perception of 
partiality and neglect among the Serb community. 
In order to advance the special status policy and 
to improve access to the Serb community, the 
development agencies ought to open liaison offices 
in Mitrovica and recruit Serbs. Furthermore, 
building ties to moderate local actors from the 
business community and civil society might help 
to mediate the special status solution.
Dialogue with Radical Nationalists. Given the 
strong influence of radical nationalists in northern 
Kosovo, the European Union may not neglect this 
share of the population and merely focus on the 
moderate forces. Instead, the EU should provide 
funding to neutral third actors, such as NGOs 
to facilitate dialogue and confidence-building 
between local nationalists, more moderate actors 
as well as Kosovo institutions.   
Capacity Building. Particularly in the face of 
the great benefits that accrue to the nationalists 
from the parallel structures, reversing their cost-
benefit calculations and establishing support for 
the status solution will require enormous efforts. 
If the Serbian government successively reduces its 
services and transfers to the Serb population in the 
north and if the conflicting parties agree to a special 
status for the north, the people will increasingly 
depend on the capacities and infrastructure of 
their autonomous region and the state of Kosovo. 
The EU consequently has to guarantee viable 
governance structures ensuring security and 
services at a Serbian standard. Given the large 
extent of needed investment in infrastructure and 
functioning democratic institutions, the EU should 
collaborate with other major donors such as the 
United States and UN institutions. While capacity 
building has to take place under consideration 
of existing constellations, the donor community 
needs to focus its enabling engagement on the 
moderate forces in delineation from nationalist 
groups.
These interventions would facilitate the 
creation of a consolidated, stable governance 
system. Serbia, Kosovo and the European Union 
all have a deep-seated interest in resolving the 
conflict in the Western Balkans. The attempts 
to settle the territorial dispute hitherto have 
not generated substantial progress. All policy 
proposals have been mutually unacceptable to the 
stakeholders. Therefore, the EU has to assume the 
mediator’s role in order to ensure stability in its 
immediate vicinity and sincere prospects for EU 
membership for both countries. 
